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The mobilization of domestic revenue has generally stagnated in low-income 
countries since the 1990s. Though progress in raising revenue in these countries began 
to accelerate by the mid-2000s, in line with the quickening of growth, the global 
recession has not only undercut the basis for significa t progress in coming years but 
also caused immediate revenue declines.  
 
Hence, the current conjuncture poses two major challenges. The first is immediate: 
identifying the means to recoup the revenue losses cau ed by a sharp slowdown in 
growth or recession in low-income countries. The second is more long-term: 
rectifying the underlying weaknesses in tax policy and administration that retarded 
progress over recent decades, even before the current c isis erupted. 
 
In this CDPR Discussion Paper we focus on 1) the longer-term challenge and on 2) 
weaknesses in tax policy. Our hypothesis is that the reigning ‘tax consensus’ has 
placed an inordinate emphasis on domestic indirect taxes, and on the value added tax, 
in particular. We also believe that this consensus ha advocated premature trade 
liberalization and needlessly weakened the basis for effective taxation of corporate 
and personal incomes. 
 
As an initial reference for our evaluation, we start with the implications that reaching 
the Millennium Development Goals should have for domestic revenue mobilization. 
This approach contrasts with the recent prevalent use of static analysis, such as the 
preoccupation with whether domestic taxes are recouping the losses from lowering 
import tariffs—without considering whether total revenue has adequately increased. 
 
In support of our approach, we refer to the UN Millennium Project, which stated in 
Investing in Development, its widely read report to the UN Secretary General in 2005, 
that a typical low-income country should be able to contribute additional public MDG 
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financing equivalent to 4 percentage points of GDP over the 10 years between 2006 
and 2015 (UN Millennium Project 2005, p. 245). 
 
This is a modest performance yardstick. One of its implications is that most of the 
public financing for the MDGs would have to be external—principally through a ‘Big 
Push’ scaling-up of Official Development Assistance. As an alternative, we believe 
that focusing on promoting domestic resource mobilization is a more viable and 
desirable long-term strategy. 
 
We expand slightly on the Project’s domestic-revenue yardstick by selecting 5 
percentage points of GDP as a barometer of success in mobilizing domestic revenue 
and apply this yardstick, retroactively, to the period of 1990-2006. We believe that 
this performance standard represents a degree of ambition that is still moderate. We 
assume that reaching it should certainly be feasible.  
 
We recognize, of course, that country performance could depend on the initial starting 
point. It should be easier, for example, for a low-income country to raise its total 
revenue from 10% of GDP to 15% than to raise it from 15% to 20%. We take the 
view that almost all low-income countries should be proactively striving to raise their 
levels of revenue. Revenue levels under 15% of GDP should be regarded, we believe, 
as unacceptably low; and those countries having already reached 15% should be 
encouraged to lift it to 20% of GDP. 
 
In order to test our yardstick of 5 percentage points of GDP against reality, we have 
assembled revenue data over the period 1990-2006 for samples of low-income 
countries with relevant data in sub-Saharan Africa, South/Southeast Asia and Central 
Asia. When we group countries together for regional comparisons, we use simple 
unweighted averages since we are interested in assessing country-level performance 
rather than regional performance. 
 
We also group the data for the overall trend in total revenue for these three samples 
into averages for three periods: 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-06. We have done this, in 
part, because it helps eliminate temporary oscillations that can be unrepresentative of 
sustained progress. This grouping of years by averages also implies that we are 
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evaluating progress, in effect, over an 11-year time span (namely, between the 
midpoint years of 1993 and 2003).  
 
For some countries, such averaging might serve to understate their degree of progress 
between the respective end-points (that is, between 1990 and 2006). But such 
endpoints could well be unrepresentative. The uneve availability of data for the 
1990s is one limiting factor. Also, the recent global crisis has already caused the 
progress achieved by 2006, our most recent end-point, t  be unsustainable.  
 
We have tested the use of such end points against our period averages and found that 
such an approach does not lead to qualitatively different results. 
 
Our general findings suggest that in sub-Saharan Africa and South and Southeast 
Asia, progress in mobilizing domestic revenue by low-income countries has been 
remarkably slow. In our small sample of low-income countries in Central Asia, whose 
histories have been markedly different from those in the other two regions, progress 
has been more credible. 
 
II. Trends in Total Revenue and Tax Revenue 
Trends in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Our sample for sub-Saharan Africa includes 29 low-income countries.iii  Our selection 
of countries was restricted by the availability of tax data disaggregated into its three 
major subcomponents, i.e., trade taxes, domestic ind rect taxes and direct taxes. Such 
a disaggregation constitutes a major basis for our analysis.iv   
 
Total revenue only increased overall from an averag of 13.3% of GDP during 1990-
94 to 15.6% during 2000-06, or by 2.3 percentage points, less than half of our 5-
percentage-point benchmark (Figure 1). The percentag  increase was 17.4%. Had the 
average absolute increase been 5 percentage points, the percentage increase would 
have been about 37%. 
 
Progress was very slow between 1990-94 and 1995-99: there was only a 5.3% 
increase in total revenue. But the pace of increase ro  to 11.4% between 1995-99 and 
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2000-06. The 2000s were a period of rising exports and growth in sub-Saharan Africa, 
which should have produced significantly higher revenue than earlier. While GDP 
among our sample of countries was growing at 4.1% per year during 1995-99, this 




The rate of increase in total revenue was affected mo estly by the trends in non-tax 
revenue. This part of revenue appeared to dip from an average of 2.4% of GDP during 
1990-94 to 2.2% during 1995-99 but then increased to 2.7% of GDP during 2000-06. 
Trends in non-tax revenue in this region—as well as elsewhere—tend to be heavily 
influenced by a few resource-rich countries because a portion of resource-related 
revenues often show up in this component. 
 
Total tax revenue increased overall in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa 
from an average of 10.9% of GDP during 1990-94 to 12.9% of GDP during 2000-06, 
or by a mere 2 percentage points (Figure 1). So, overall revenue performance in this 
region has been relatively poor. 
 
Trends in South and Southeast Asia 
There are far fewer low-income countries in Asia. And our sample has been further 
limited by the availability of tax data for such countries. For our analysis, we have 
been able to assemble relevant data for seven countries, which are located in South 
and Southeast Asia (Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan and 
Vietnam).  
 
Because of the lack of data for 1990-1994 for some countries, we have been able to 
systematically cover only the periods of 1995-99 and 2000-06. In light of this 
restriction, we take a 3 percentage point increase in total revenue as our benchmark of 
success (since the period of the 2000s includes more years and its growth tended to be 
faster than in the 1990s). 
 
Surprisingly, average levels of both total revenue and tax revenue in South and 
Southeast Asia are relatively low compared to those for sub-Saharan Africa.v 
 7 
Additionally, for our sample, total revenue increasd slowly—from an average of 
12.5% of GDP during 1995-99 to only 13.7% of GDP during 2000-06, or by only 
9.6%. The absolute increase was only 1.2 percentage points. This is less than half of 
our benchmark of 3 percentage points of GDP (Figure 2).  
 
Many of these countries were growing at relatively healthy rates during the 2000s, so 
one would have expected larger increases. While the average growth rate of GDP in 
our sample of seven low-income countries was 5.7% during 1995-99, this rate rose to 
6.4% during 2000-06—and during 2004-06 alone it reach d 7.6%.  
 
Total tax revenue in our sample of seven Asian low-income countries increased by 
even less than total revenue. While average tax revenue was a very low 9.8% of GDP 
during 1995-99, it rose to only 10.6% during 2000-06, that is, by just 0.8 percentage 
point (Figure 2). At the same time, non-tax revenue added the other 0.4 percentage 




Hence, progress in South/Southeast Asia has been similarly slow to that in sub-
Saharan Africa. The former’s revenue increases were comparable to those for sub-
Saharan Africa when the latter’s longer time period (1990-94 to 2000-06) is taken into 
account. 
 
Trends in Central Asia 
We have also tried to assemble data for the small number of low-income countries in 
Central Asia, including for Mongolia (which is usually categorized as part of East 
Asia). We have succeeded in doing so for four countries: Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Our data have been limited to the periods of 1995-99 and 
2000-06 because relevant data are unavailable for some countries for the early 1990s, 
when their transition to more market-based economies began. 
 
Arguably, some of these countries could have been considered low middle-income 
countries during the Soviet era even though statistics for national output during that 
period are not comparable to those for GDP since 1990. Nevertheless, all of these 
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countries experienced significant drops in national i come during the early 1990s and 
were accordingly classified as low-income.  
 
The statistics on both total revenue and tax revenue s ggest that these transition 
economies had already regained above-average levels by the mid-1990s and that, 
moreover, they still made significant progress between 1995-99 and 2000-06. 
 
Total revenues in these four countries increased from 21.8% of GDP during 1995-99, 
already fairly high for low-income countries, to 25. % during 2000-06, or by 3.4 
percentage points. This is above our benchmark of 3 percentage points of GDP 
(Figure 3). This represents a 15.6% increase, notewor hy since the starting-point was 
already fairly high. Non-tax revenue exhibited no discernible increase, remaining at 
3.3% of GDP. 
 
Total tax revenue increased from 18.5% of GDP during 1995-99 to 21.9% during 
2000-06. Understandably, it accounted for the full increase of 3.4 percentage points in 
total revenue (Figure 3).  
 
While the level of tax revenue had reached almost 22% of GDP in these four 
countries, it was only about 13% in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa and 




Hence, the performance of the four countries in Central Asia appears to be atypical of 
low-income countries during the period that we are examining. Likely reasons are the 
larger size of their formal sectors, as well as their greater state capacity to raise 
revenue.  
 
The level of incomer per capita is not a decisive differentiating factor. While 
Mongolia has a fairly high level of income per capit  for a low-income country, the 
other three countries have much more typical levels. For instance, Kyrgyzstan’s gross 
national income per capita in 2006 was US$ 500 while Tajikistan’s was only US$ 
390. 
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III.  Trends in the Components of Tax Revenue 
In this section we disaggregate tax revenue into its three major components: domestic 
direct taxes (such as on income and wealth), domestic indirect taxes (such as on 
consumption of goods and services) and trade taxes (such as imports). We ignore 
mentioning the residual category, ‘other tax revenue’ (which includes miscellaneous 
fees and charges) except where it is an important factor.  
 
Our main motivation in examining the disaggregated data is to try to lay an initial 
basis for explaining the anaemic trends in tax revenue in most low-income countries. 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
In our sample of 29 low-income countries in sub-Sahar n Africa, all three major 
components increased as a percentage of GDP between 1990-94 and 2000-06. Indirect 
domestic taxes rose by the most, that is, by 1.5 percentage points—i.e., from 3.5% of 
GDP to 5.0% (Figure 4). This represents a credible percentage increase of almost 
43%.  
 
Direct taxes rose by only 0.9 percentage point—namely, from 2.9% of GDP to 3.8% 
(Figure 4). Trade taxes rose by even less, namely, 0.3 percentage point, or from 3.8% 




So, while domestic indirect taxes contributed signif cantly to the MDG benchmark of 
achieving an additional 5 percentage points of GDP, the other two components 
performed more poorly.  
 
Undoubtedly, trade liberalization played a role in slowing progress on trade taxes. 
Imports were growing faster than GDP in this region. Among our sample of 29 
countries, imports as a ratio to GDP increased, for example, from 33.4% during 1995-
99 to 38.8% during 2000-06. In addition, despite increases in their growth in the 
2000s, these countries appeared to have had only moderate success in boosting direct 
taxes, such as on corporate and personal income.  
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Our basic hypothesis about the lack of revenue progress in sub-Saharan Africa is that 
the conventional advice provided on trade taxes andincome taxes effectively 
eliminated any prospect that these countries would achieve significant gains. 
 
South and Southeast Asia 
The trends in South and Southeast Asia between 1995-9  and 2000-06 were different 
than in sub-Saharan Africa. Direct taxes increased by 0.9 percentage point of GDP, 
from 2.2% of GDP to 3.1% (Figure 5). This is a better performance than in sub-
Saharan Africa, where the same increase was spread ov r a much longer period.  
 
Part of the explanation is no doubt a faster rate of c nomic growth in Asia. GDP 
increased at rate of 5.7% per year in these countries during 1995-99 and 6.4% during 




Domestic indirect taxes increased by 0.8 percentage point of GDP, from 3.8% of GDP 
to 4.6% (Figure 5). This percentage point increase is comparable to the 1.5 percentage 
point increase of such taxes in sub-Saharan Africa over a period almost twice as long. 
 
But, most strikingly, trade taxes declined by 0.9 percentage point, i.e., from 3.1% of 
GDP to 2.2% (Figure 5). This decline occurred coincidentally with a significant rise in 
imports between the two periods, namely, from 31.9% of GDP to 37.6%.  
 
The decline in trade taxes effectively nullified the positive performance of 0.9 
percentage point of GDP by direct taxes in South/Southeast Asia. Hence, general 
progress on tax revenue in South/Southeast Asia was slower, overall, than in sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
During 2000-06, South/Southeast Asia differed from sub-Saharan Africa primarily 
with regard to the level of trade taxes. While such taxes were 4.1% of GDP during 




These results suggest that trade liberalization had been carried out more intensively in 
Asia. The shares of total tax revenue accounted for by both direct taxes and domestic 
indirect taxes in South/Southeast Asia were more comparable to those in sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
 
The trends of tax components in Asia suggest that te increases in both direct and 
indirect domestic taxes were simply too modest to attain the feasible benchmark of 3 
percentage points of GDP in the face of the absolute losses in trade taxes.   
 
Central Asia 
The relative progress of the three components in the four low-income countries in 
Central Asia was strikingly different from that in either South/Southeast Asia or sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
The starting points in Central Asia also differed markedly. During 1995-99, direct 
taxes in the Central Asian countries were 7.5% of GDP—compared to only 3.3% in 
sub-Saharan Africa and 2.2% in South/Southeast Asia.vi  
 
Also, domestic indirect taxes were far higher in Central Asia—namely, 8.4% of GDP 
during 1995-99 compared to 3.9% in sub-Saharan Africa and 3.8% in South/ 
Southeast Asia. 
 
The higher levels of both direct and indirect domestic taxation in this region are likely 
to be due to factors such as more formalized economies and greater initial state 
capacity. Certainly, the historical development of hese economies has been distinctly 
different from that in the other two regions. 
 
In contrast to the other two tax components, trade t x s were significantly lower in 
Central Asia during 1995-99 than in sub-Saharan Africa or South/Southeast Asia: 
only 1.7% of GDP compared to 3.9% and 3.1%, respectively. It is likely that this 
resulted from the legacy of low trade barriers within t e former Soviet bloc. 
 
In addition to being relatively low, trade taxes in Central Asia stagnated between 
1995-99 and 2000-06, starting at 1.7% of GDP and ending up at the very low level of 
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only 1.8% (Figure 6). This level represented only a 9.4% share of total tax revenue 
despite the fact that imports were well above 50% of GDP in these countries during 




The most important component of tax revenue in Central Asia, indirect domestic 
taxes, rose between 1995-99 and 2000-06 by 1.6 percentage points to reach 10.0% of 
GDP (Figure 6). Hence, this component ended up accounting, on average, for over 
45.7% of all tax revenue during 2000-06. Meanwhile, direct taxes rose by 1.7 
percentage points to reach 9.2% of GDP, or 42% of total ax revenue (Figure 6). 
 
In other words, tax revenue rose significantly in Central Asia between 1995-99 and 
2000-06 because of substantial contributions from both direct and indirect domestic 
taxes. A sharp rise in economic growth undoubtedly assisted this process. During 
1995-99, the yearly growth of GDP in these four countries was only 1.6%, as they 
were still struggling with the difficulties of the transition. By 2000-06, however, their 
yearly GDP growth had risen to 6.1%. 
  
IV. Country-Level Performance 
Next, we examine the performance of individual countries in the three regions. What 
we find is that there is a shortage of ‘success stories’.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
In sub-Saharan Africa, over the relatively long period of 1990-94 to 2000-06, only 
five countries succeeded in boosting their total revenue by 5 percentage points or 
more of GDP. These include Sudan (9.2 percentage points), Mauritania (8.2 
percentage points), Ghana (7.5 percentage points), Rwanda (6.0 percentage points) 
and (perhaps surprisingly) Guinea-Bissau (5.8 percentage points).vii  
 
Revenue increases in Sudan, Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau were driven by resource-
related revenue, oil in the case of Sudan and off-shore fishing licenses in the cases of 
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Mauritania and Guinea-Bissau. Non-resource tax revenues in all three countries have 
been less dynamic.  
 
While Rwanda’s progress was laudable, its average rev nue as a ratio to GDP 
increased from a very small base of 6.4% of GDP during 1990-94 to only 12.4% 
during 2000-06. But this advance was obtained, in reality, between 1995-99 and 2000-
06, with marked increases in both direct taxes and domestic indirect taxes powering 
the overall rise in revenue. 
 
This leaves one country, Ghana, which arguably could be considered to have achieved 
notable success in raising revenue. With a GNI per capita of only US$ 500 in 2006, 
Ghana is certainly not close to becoming a lower middle income country. Hence, its 
performance cannot be explained by a relatively high income level. 
 
We investigate Ghana’s performance more closely in a case study in the Annex. 
Ghana is notable for having achieved across-the-board increases in its three main tax 
components. Direct taxes increased markedly due to advances in both corporate 
income taxes and taxes on personal income (including income from the self-
employed).  
 
Increases in domestic indirect taxes resulted from credible performances by a VAT, 
excise taxes and a tax on petroleum products. Ghana w s also able to maintain above-
average levels of trade taxes, even taxing its main export crop, cocoa. 
 
Unlike Ghana, very few low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa have managed to 
increase revenue beyond 20% of GDP.  In fact, four countries that had earlier 
achieved such levels or gotten close—namely, Cote d’Ivoire, the Gambia, Kenya and 
Zambia—were the four countries in our sample that los revenue between 1990-94 
and 2000-06. 
 
Many low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa continue to have very low revenue 
levels. In fact, 13 out of the 29 countries in our sample still had average total revenues 
below 15% of GDP during 2000-06. Thus, supporting revenue progress in these 
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countries should be a high priority. Such low levels of revenue severely handicap 
basic state capacity. 
  
South and Southeast Asia 
The performance of individual countries has been even more dismal in 
South/Southeast Asia than in sub-Saharan Africa. During 2000-06 only one country, 
namely, Vietnam, had average central-government revenue above 15% of GDP.  
 
Moreover, when one examines progress either between 1995-99 and 2000-06 or 
between 1990-94 and 2000-06 (which can be done for just four countries), only 
Vietnam could be regarded as having made significant progress. Between 1990-94 
and 2000-06, its total revenue as a ratio to GDP rose from 18.9% to 23.9%, or by 5 
percentage points. Total revenue (as well as tax revenue) basically stagnated in the 
other six countries.  
 
Thus, we examine more closely Vietnam’s experience in the Annex in order to 
determine why its performance was so unusual. Vietnam’s income per capita is not 
high. For example, its GNI per capita in 2006 was US$ 690. 
 
Direct taxes constituted Vietnam’s most important tax component. But increases in 
this component were due mostly to taxing corporate income, primarily from the oil 
sector, but also secondarily from foreign-owned firms in general. Increases in royalty 
fees from the oil sector also augmented non-tax revenue.  
 
However, Vietnam also succeeded in achieving relatively high levels of both domestic 
indirect taxes and trade taxes, at least by regional standards. So, the diversification of 
sources of taxation is part of the Vietnam success story. 
 
Central Asia 
Compared to revenue performance in South/Southeast Asia, performance in our 
sample of four Central Asian low-income countries was clearly superior. As was the 
case for South/Southeast Asia, our analysis had to be confined mostly to the period 
between 1995-99 and 2000-06.  
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Mongolia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan all made significant progress over this period. 
Mongolia’s total revenue as a ratio to GDP increased by 7.7 percentage points while 
Tajikistan’s increased by 4.2 percentage points and Kyrgyzstan’s by 3.7. All of these 
are significant increases over such a short period of time (higher than our 3 percentage 
point yardstick). 
 
Uzbekistan’s revenue ratio dropped by 1.8 percentag points but its average level of 
revenue remained at over 31% of GDP during 2000-06. This rivalled Mongolia’s level 
of 33.6%.  
 
Though a relatively poor country, Tajikistan made cr dible progress, reaching 16.8% 
of GDP during 2000-06 from a relatively low revenue base of 12.6% during 1995-99. 
It relied mostly on domestic indirect taxes (e.g., excise taxes and the VAT) and 
secondarily on direct taxes and non-tax revenue. Kyrgyzstan’s progress can be 
attributed to more even progress of direct taxes, non-tax revenue and domestic 
indirect taxes (in their order of importance). Its total revenue averaged 19.2% of GDP 
during 2000-06, up from 15.5% during 1995-99. 
 
For more in-depth study, we choose Mongolia both because of its high level of 
revenue and its significant increase in revenue. The analysis of its experience is 
included in the Annex. Mongolia made remarkable progress partly because of 
boosting resource-related revenues. Rising copper and gold prices translated, for 
example, into both higher corporate tax revenues and higher royalty fees.  
 
But Mongolia is also noteworthy for having attained increases across all of its major 
revenue components, including trade taxes. Hence, i some respects similar to Ghana 
and Vietnam, Mongolia was successful in diversifying its sources of revenue. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
The general picture that emerges from our analysis of regional trends and some key 
individual country cases is not encouraging. Many of the low-income countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa, South/Southeast Asia and Central Asia that have mobilized 
substantial revenue (either between 1990-94 and 2000-06 or between 1995-99 and 
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2000-06) have done so on the basis of taxation of natural resources, such as oil, 
copper, gold and fishing resources.  
 
Both Vietnam and Mongolia are in this category. But there are others, such as 
Mauritania and Sudan, which we have not highlighted. Success in taxation of 
resources often shows up in advances in direct taxes (such as corporate income taxes) 
and non-tax revenues (such as royalty fees). 
 
Our data do not allow us to disaggregate resource rev nues from non-resource 
revenues. So, these conclusions should be considered only as working hypotheses for 
future research. However, recent IMF research that has apparently been able to 
differentiate resource revenue from non-resource rev nues has shown that since the 
mid-1990s the general rise in tax revenue in sub-Saharan Africa is explained mostly 
by increases in revenue from natural resources (Keen and Mansour 2009). Tellingly, 
there has been virtually no upward trend in non-resource tax revenue.  
 
These findings underscore the importance of ensuring that low-income countries have 
the capacity to effectively negotiate with multinational corporations in order to secure 
an equitable public share in any resource rents. This is especially important because 
many such resources are non-renewable. For example, Mauritania has already had to 
confront the danger of rapid depletion of its offshore fishing resources by foreign 
fishing boats from the EU and elsewhere. 
 
For those low-income countries that lack valuable natural resources, the only other 
viable strategy that emerges from our analysis is to promote the diversification of the 
sources of revenue. Ghana appears to have followed this strategy with a notable 
degree of success, achieving important across-the-board increases in domestic indirect 
taxes, direct taxes and trade taxes. 
 
The fall-back alternative appears to be a strategy hat at least maximizes increases in 
both direct and indirect domestic taxes. For instance, countries in Central Asia such as 
Mongolia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan succeeded in achieving significant increases in 
both components between 1995-99 and 2000-06. In South/Southeast Asia, Vietnam 
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was also able to do the same; and in sub-Saharan Africa, Rwanda achieved some 
limited success. 
 
Unfortunately, conventional advice on tax policies attaches the most importance to 
domestic indirect taxation, and to value added taxation in particular. But this 
component represents only one of three potential engin s of revenue mobilization 
(leaving aside non-tax revenue, which is often associated mainly with resource 
revenue).  
 
Moreover, taxes on domestic goods and services can ofte  be regressive in their 
impact. Placing greater emphasis on them is part of the conventional wisdom that has 
become increasingly willing to sacrifice equity in favour of the objective of 
supposedly enhancing tax efficiency (Norregaard and Khan 2007). 
 
Relying mostly on dynamism in domestic indirect taxation, as has been the standard 
approach, poses severe challenges to revenue mobilization. Our regional findings 
suggest that while the increase in domestic indirect taxes has been credible in Central 
Asia, increases in South/Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have been modest.  
 
Importantly, progress in domestic indirect taxes ha been too slow to generate a 
decisive step-increase in revenue mobilization in most low-income countries. Even in 
Central Asia, general revenue performance depended critically on both direct and 
indirect domestic taxes. This lesson was flagged, in fact, by the IMF Fiscal Affairs 
Department some time ago (IMF 2005a). 
 
Trade liberalization has taken its toll on revenue in all three regions that we have 
examined. Trade taxes have decreased in South/Southeast Asia, stagnated in Central 
Asia, and increased only negligibly over a longer piod of time in sub-Saharan 
Africa. So, except in the rare cases in which both direct and indirect domestic taxes 
have risen substantially, the stagnation (or loss) of revenue from trade taxes has 
doomed most low-income countries to a low-revenue trap. 
 
In some regions, such as sub-Saharan Africa, where trade taxes still constitute a 
significant proportion of total tax revenue, the losses in the future from further trade 
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liberalization are likely to be particularly damagin . At the same time, further gains to 
be reaped from the VAT are not likely to be substantial (Keen and Mansour 2009). 
These factors add urgency to accelerating gains in direct taxes. 
 
In the three regions that we have examined, the record of direct taxes has been mixed. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, direct taxes increased only modestly (that is, by 0.9 percentage 
point) between 1990-94 and 2000-06. In South/Southeast Asia, low-income countries 
did better, achieving a similar increase of 0.9 percentage point over a shorter period.  
 
In sharp contrast, direct taxes rose significantly, i.e., by 1.7 percentage points, in 
Central Asia between 1995-99 and 2000-06. Such progress is likely attributable, in 
significant part, to the levels of formalisation of these economies attained during the 
Soviet period. 
 
There are major structural reasons why many other low-income countries can have 
difficulty in boosting such taxes. A large informal sector poses constraints, as does a 
sizeable agricultural sector. However, neither constraint should be used as an excuse 
to abandon ambitious efforts to boost revenue. Practical means have to be found to 
overcome these constraints. 
 
More important, we believe, is that conventional tax dvice has contributed to 
difficulties by focusing advocacy on the reduction f top rates on corporate income 
and personal income. The predicted effect was the enlargements of the tax base. But 
there is little evidence to support the claim that b se widening has occurred as a result 
of rate cuts. Moreover, the progressivity of national tax structures has been weakened 
in the process. 
 
There appears to be some tentative evidence that corporate taxes might have increased 
in the 2000s, whereas they had clearly decreased in the 1990s. But the base for 
corporate taxes appears to have stagnated, if not declined—partly due to the 
widespread use of tax-reducing incentives to attract FDI. Hence, a likelier explanation 
for increased revenue appears to be the fattening of corporate profits, particularly 
those related to resource-related incomes. (Keen and Mansour 2009; Norregaard and 
Khan 2007).  
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On practical grounds, the reduction of corporate income tax rates has been particularly 
problematic because such taxes—along with trade taxs—have been an important 
source of revenue for low-income countries.  
 
Both corporate incomes taxes and trade taxes also tend to be easier to administer than 
many other forms of taxation. Hence, the weakening of these two tax handles has 
placed unrealistically heavy burdens on the rest of the tax structure of low-income 
countries to generate any substantial increases in revenue. 
 
In summary, the stagnation or loss of revenue from trade taxes has acted as a dead 
weight on efforts to substantially boost domestic revenue in low-income countries. As 
a consequence, our MDG-related goal of increasing total revenue by 5 percentage 
points of GDP between 1990-94 and 2000-06 would have had to rely on major 
compensating achievements by both of the other two major tax components, that is, 
direct taxes or domestic indirect taxes.  
 
But, except in our small sample of Central Asian economies, neither of these 
components achieved the rapid increases that would have been required to add 5 
percentage points of revenue to GDP. Progress on direct taxes has been slow, 
especially in sub-Saharan Africa, principally because of the lack of progress on 
corporate income taxes (Norregaard and Khan 2007).  
 
Moreover, in many of the individual cases where the MDG benchmark has been 
reached, resource-related revenues have played a prominent role. These findings 
suggest that we need to substantially rethink the design of tax policies for low-income 
countries. Holding the line on further cuts in tariffs would make sense in low-income 
countries that are unable to obtain major medium-ter  advances in both direct and 
indirect domestic taxes.  
 
In addition, we need to find ways to enlarge the base for direct taxes without 




Lowering the minimum threshold for the payment of personal income taxes could 
help in many countries, since the base of taxpayers is u ually small. Instituting some 
forms of taxation of wealth could also contribute to raising revenue. Introducing land 
or real estate taxes are examples (though these revenu s often accrue to local 
governments). 
 
Finally, we need to critically examine why domestic indirect taxes, such as the much 
vaunted VAT, have had generally lacklustre success in low-income countries in sub-
Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia. For example, how could improvements be 
made in the VAT’s coverage of domestic goods and services, especially those 
provided by informal-sector enterprises?  
 
While VAT rates could, in theory, substitute for import tariffs, the VAT’s coverage of 
domestic goods and services is effectively limited to what is marketed in the formal 
sector. Hence, the size of any net gains from substit ting the VAT for import tariffs 
was severely constrained even from the starting gate. 
 
Hence, we believe that the reigning consensus on tax policies has contributed to the 
general stagnation of revenue in low-income countries since the early 1990s. Much of 
the tax advice has been ill-suited to the economic conditions in such countries. 
Unrealistic expectations have been placed on the rev nue potential of domestic 
indirect taxes, premature reductions have been made in trade taxes, and needless 
weakening has been approved for direct taxes. Consequently, there appears to be a 
pressing need for a fundamental re-evaluation and re-design of prevailing policies. 
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Figure 4: Sub-Saharan Africa 



















Figure 5: South/Southeast Asia 
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Figure 6: Central Asia
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VIII.  Annex 
 
Three Case Studies 
In this Annex, we highlight the performance of the t ree countries—Ghana in sub-
Saharan Africa, Vietnam in South/Southeast Asia and Mongolia in Central Asia—
which have done relatively well in mobilizing domestic revenue. By examining their 
experiences more closely, we hope to draw out some relevant general lessons on how 
to achieve success in mobilizing domestic revenue i low-income countries. 
 
Vietnam 
Though a low-income country, Vietnam has had relative success in raising domestic 
revenue. For our sample of seven low-income countries in South/Southeast Asia, the 
averages for tax revenue and total revenue for 2000-06 were 10.6% of GDP and 
13.6% of GDP, respectively. But these same averages for Vietnam were notably 
higher, i.e., 18.2% and 23.9%, respectively. 
 
During 1990-94, Vietnam had averaged tax revenues that were 13.1% of GDP and 
total revenues that were 18.9%. So, on both measures, th  increases between 1990-94 
and 2000-06 were about five percentage points of GDP. This is an especially 
noteworthy achievement since Vietnam had started at above-average levels of 
revenue. How can this achievement be explained? 
 
Vietnam had started to establish a tax system appropriate to a more market-based 
economy in the late 1980s. Previously, three quarters of government revenue had been 
drawn from the surpluses of State-Owned Enterprises. But by 1994, about four-fifths 
of all domestic revenue came from tax collection. Tariffs had replaced quantitative 
trade restrictions; corporate taxes had begun to increase on non-state enterprises and 
joint ventures; and revenues from SOEs had increased substantially, partially from 
crude oil production. 
 
Domestic indirect taxes initially took the form of a turnover tax and a special 
consumption (or excise) tax on undesirable goods, such as cigarettes, alcohol and 
firecrackers. Direct taxes were heavily weighted towards corporate income taxes. The 
personal income tax was—and has remained—a very small proportion of total tax 
revenue, focused mostly on the wage income of well-paid workers in the modern 
corporate sector (See IMF 1998). 
 
During 2000-06, when Vietnam’s average tax revenue was about 18% of GDP and its 
average total revenue was almost 24% of GDP, its tax s ructure exhibited some 
unusual features. The first notable feature is thatits direct taxes were the most 
important component, representing 8.2% of GDP. By comparison, domestic indirect 
taxes amounted to 6.3% of GDP. Trade taxes, which ac ounted for 3.3% of GDP, 
were above-average for South/Southeast Asia, but not u usually so. The second 
notable feature of Vietnam’s tax structure is the high percentage of non-tax revenue, 
which was 5.7% of GDP. 
 
Unlike some other low-income countries, Vietnam had succeeded in reaping 
significant rewards from an export commodity—in this case, the production and 
export of crude oil. Revenue from crude oil has boosted both corporate income taxes 
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and charges and fees, which are part of non-tax revenue. As a result, oil revenues 
accounted for about 30% of all revenue in the 2000s (Lee 2006).  
 
Also, between the late 1990s and early 2000s, Vietnam succeeded in roughly doubling 
corporate income taxes from foreign-invested enterprises. During this period, the 
share of revenue from direct taxes almost doubled, namely, to about 33%, while the 
shares derived from domestic indirect taxes and trade taxes both declined 
significantly. 
 
Vietnam could continue strengthening its receipts from direct taxes if it focused on 
increasing corporate income taxes from the private sector, both domestic and foreign, 
and lowered the threshold for the personal income tax in order to expand its small 
base of taxpayers. 
 
Mongolia 
Among our small sample of four transition economies in Central (and Eastern) Asia, 
Mongolia has made the most progress in mobilizing domestic revenue. Its level of 
revenue exceeds that of the other three countries.  
 
Between 1995-99 and 2000-06, Mongolia’s total revenue as a ratio to GDP rose from 
25.9% (which was already a high level) to 33.6%, or by 7.7 percentage points. 
Mongolia’s tax revenue increased at a similar rate, that is, from 19.4% of GDP to 
26.6% between 1995-99 and 2000-06.  
 
Direct taxes represent a significant share of Mongolia’s total tax revenue. During 
2000-06, they had risen to an average of 10.7% of GDP, from 8.6% of GDP in the late 
1990s. Corporate tax revenues increased because of rising levels of copper and gold 
prices and increased mining activities (see IMF 2005b).  
 
Non-tax revenues are also relatively high in Mongolia because of the importance of 
mining activities. During 2000-06, for instance, non-tax revenue was 6.9% of GDP, 
up from 6.5% during 1995-99.  So, Mongolia’s high level of revenue has been due, in 
no small measure, to resource-related revenues. 
 
However, the overall increase of direct taxes in Mongolia was abated, especially in 
the non-mining sectors of the economy, because of the reduction in the corporate 
income tax rate from 40% to 30% (though the resultant r te is still higher than in most 
other transition economies). 
 
Revenues from the personal income tax (PIT) continued to increase in Mongolia 
between the late 1990s and 2000s, with most of this revenue being derived from 
wages and salaries. Mongolia achieved such increases because it had set a relatively 
low PIT threshold compared to that established in many other developing and 
emerging economies.viii  
 
What is worth noting is that all of the major components of Mongolia’s tax revenue, 
including ‘other taxes’, rose as a percentage of GDP from the late 1990s to the 2000s. 
The largest component, domestic indirect taxes, rose from an average of 8.3% of GDP 
to 11.1%.  
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This rise can be attributed to the increase of the VAT rate from 10% to 15% but also 
from increased VAT revenues from a rising level of imports. Between the late 1990s 
and early 2000s, Mongolia’s imports rose dramatically, from about 40% of GDP to 
70%. The country’s trade taxes also increased as a re ult, though modestly, to 2% of 
GDP, compared to 0.8% during 1995-99. Mongolia’s trade taxes are low because it 
imposes only a 5% tariff on imports. 
 
Excise taxes also represent a significant share of tax revenue in Mongolia. During the 
early 2000s, they had increased to over 4% of GDP. The main excise taxes are levied 
on consumption of oil, vodka and beer. 
 
So, an important general point is that although Mongolia’s success has been heavily 
dependent on resource-related revenues, it has also benefited from diversifying its 
sources of revenues across a number of different components.  
 
Ghana 
Ghana is one of the most successful low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa in 
mobilizing domestic revenue. During 1990-94, Ghana’s r tio of total revenue to GDP 
averaged 14.2%. But by 2000-06, this average had risen to 21.6%, that is, to a level 
that was clearly above-average for a country with low per capita income. 
 
The performance of Ghana’s tax revenue paralleled that of its total revenue. During 
1990-94, its tax revenue as a ratio to GDP was only 12.8% but by 2000-06 this 
average had increased to 19.9%. This 7.1 percentage-point rise in the average level of 
tax revenue is remarkable. In low-income sub-Saharan Africa, only resource-rich 
Sudan and Mauritania performed better. 
 
How did Ghana succeed in raising government revenue? The results noted above 
show that non-tax revenue did not play an important role. Ghana’s success appears to 
have been attributable to across-the-board increases in the three major components of 
tax revenue, namely, direct taxes, domestic indirect taxes and trade taxes. 
 
Direct taxes (such as on personal and corporate income) rose substantially. While 
during 1990-94, the average level of direct taxes was only 2.7% of GDP, this 
component rose to an average of 6.3% of GDP during 2000-06. During the 2000s, 
Ghana was able to push corporate tax revenue up to about 3% of GDP and revenue 
from wages and salaries up to about 2.4% (See IMF 2007).  
 
Ghana was even able to secure tax revenue from the self- mployed, which accounted 
for about 0.4% of GDP. Though most of the base for personal income taxes is still the 
public sector in Ghana, the government is making efforts to broaden the base to the 
private sector, and to the large informal private sector in particular. 
 
Ghana’s progress on domestic indirect taxes was also significant. During 1990-94 the 
average level of such taxes was 6.5% of GDP whereas during 2000-06 it had risen to 
9.2%, and was still rising. Such increases were due partly to the rise in the VAT rate 
from 10% to 15%. But about 70% of VAT revenues still came from taxing imports. In 
addition, Ghana obtained 0.7-0.8% of GDP in revenue d ring the 2000s from taxing 
petroleum products and another 0.25% from other excis  taxes.  
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Ghana has been noteworthy in trying to extend the coverage of taxation to the 
informal sector. For example, the government has sought to determine VAT 
obligations by checking the registration of the value of vehicles. Also, it has set a low 
flat rate of 3% on sales in order to provide greater motivation for the payment of 
indirect taxes. 
 
Unlike in many other low-income countries, revenue from trade taxes increased 
significantly in Ghana between the early 1990s and the 2000s. During 1990-94, trade 
taxes accounted on average for 3.6% of GDP whereas by 2000-06 they had risen to 
account for 4.5%. During the 2000s, import duties continued to represent about 3.5% 
of GDP. Ghana’s tariffs still ranged between 5% and20%. But Ghana also continued 
to impose levies on some of its exports, mainly on c coa. As result, export taxes 
continued to contribute about 1% of GDP in revenue. 
 
Thus, Ghana’s success in raising revenue appears to be tied to a strategy that has 
established a diversified base of taxation, which has relied on all three major tax 
components, that is, direct taxes (both corporate and personal), domestic indirect taxes 
(both VAT and non-VAT) and trade taxes (both on imports and exports). Ghana has 
relied much less than Vietnam or Mongolia on resource taxes although it expects to 







                                                
i Hannah Bargawi, Research Officer of CDPR, also contributed research to help complete this 
Discussion Paper 
ii At the time of writing, Katerina Kyrili was Acting Research Officer at CDPR.  
iii  Our sample of low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa includes: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Zambia. 
iv Our sample for 1990-94 is, however, only 24 countries because of lack of a full data set. 
v For the purposes of comparability, our data include central government revenue for India although its 
consolidated general government revenue is higher because of the inclusion of state-level revenues. 
However, this leads to little difference in our overall results. 
vi Social security contributions, which we include here under direct taxes, are significant in some of the 
Central Asian countries 
vii Lowering the yardstick to an increase of 4 percentage points of GDP would only add Benin and 
Chad to our list. By 2000-06, Chad’s revenue only aver ged 9.6% of GDP, however. While Benin’s 
revenue level had risen from 12.3% during 1990-94 to reach 16.7% during 2000-06, 2.6 percentage 
points of this absolute increase were attributable to boosting trade revenue to almost 8% of GDP. 
viii   Our analysis does not include social security contributions, which are also significant. 
 
 
